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 1 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW’S WRECKAGE:  
DEPOLITICIZATION, INEQUALITY, PRECARITY  
 
Nicolás M. Perrone and David Schneiderman 
 
 
Introduction 
If law comes to reflect the interests the of the economically powerful, 
then it is the task of critical legal scholars to ‘call into question every 
victory, past and present, of the rulers.’1 International economic law (IEL), 
in our view, gives expression to the ruling ideas of our time. International 
trade and investment law, which we assimilate under the label of IEL, 
promote the movement of goods, services and capital across borders with 
few qualifications. Though given expression in differing legal orders, each 
with its own set of complex legal rules and mechanisms of enforcement, 
they are cognate systems of law having more than coincidental points of 
resemblance. They constitute part of what can be called the legal culture of 
capitalism,2 having as one of its objects the depoliticization of markets 
rendering inequality, within and between states and regions, more difficult 
to address. 
As with other law, trade and investment rules together with the 
personnel who interpret them, express preferences about how social life 
should be organized. While different interests struggle over the negotiation 
and interpretation of these rules, only some are invited to the table to 
participate. Most others are subject to those rules.3 Moreover, only certain 
rules from certain locales are candidates for adoption in the global arena, 
typically those associated with property and contract articulated in Global 
North. In the case of international trade and investment rules, these 
preferences determine where raw materials will be produced, where goods 
will be manufactured, and how foreign investors will be treated abroad. In 
other words, these rules determine who will benefit, who will lose and, 
perhaps more importantly, who will adapt to whom so as to render the 
policy goals of trade and investment rules most efficacious. The result is a 
world of winners and losers. 
We aim to scrutinize these novel systems of global legal order 
through the lens of critical international political economy. This is a mode 
of analysis that interrogates relations between dominant and subordinate 
forces in international spheres. These relations are also referred to, 
                                                             
1 KARL MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 64 (edited by C.J. Arthur) (International Publishers 
1989) and Walter Benjamin, ‘Thesis IV’ in MICHAEL LÖWY, FIRE ALARM: READING WALTER 
BENJAMIN’S ‘ON THE CONCEPT OF HISTORY’ 37 (translated by Chris Turner) (Verso 2016). 
2 David Singh Grewal, Book Review: The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014). 
3 DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: HOW POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (2016). 
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variously, as those between Centre and Periphery or between Global North 
and Global South. We use these pairings interchangeably, though these 
territorial binaries are breaking down as countries in the periphery move 
closer to the centre and as labour forces in the centre look more like those 
in the periphery.  
What is emphasized is the contingent nature of global legal orders 
questioning, thereby, their ‘aura of naturalness and necessity.’4 While there 
has been much talk of the irreversibility of the rules and institutions of 
global economic integration, recent developments in the U.K. and U.S. 
suggest that they remain contested and vulnerable to changes of direction. 
The critical mode of political economy allows us to probe these global legal 
orders, then, not as ‘divinely ordained’ nor as the outcome of fortuitous 
‘blind chance’	  but as the product of distributive choices made by those 
granted privileged access to determining their content.5  ‘Structures are not 
“givens,” advises Cox, but are ‘made by collective human action and 
transformable by collective human action.’6 No grand theoretical project is 
pursued, instead, the aim is to reveal the specificity of power rendering its 
mechanisms more vulnerable to resistance and rollback.7 If the pessimist 
appreciates that there are constraints on future action, the ‘pessimist as 
critic,’ Cox observes, seeks out ‘contradictions in the status quo that might 
become triggers of change.’8 
The frame we adopt enables us to better comprehend the impact of 
IEL regimes upon the precarious – those not granted any solicitude by its 
edicts. Precarity is the legally induced condition in which certain 
populations suffer from failing legal networks of support, more so than 
others, thereby differentially exposed to economic impacts.9 We speak of 
the poor – the ‘part of those who have no part,’ in Rancière’s evocative 
terms. 10  Precariousness, Butler adds, ‘implies living socially’ but in a 
                                                             
4 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY – AN ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE 
SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY, PART I 58 
(1987). 
5 SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS, 2ND ED. 18 (1994). Joost Pauwelyn makes a similar 
argument, that investment law is a ‘spontaneous order emerging from decentralized 
interactions’  in Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex 
Adaptive System, How it Emerged and How it Can Be Reformed 29 ICSID REV 372, 375-6 
(2014). 
6 ROBERT W. COX, PRODUCTION, POWER, AND WORLD ORDER: SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MAKING OF 
HISTORY 395 (Columbia University Press, 1987). 
7 Michel Foucault, Powers and Strategies in MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED 
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977 134-45, 145 (Colin Gordon, ed. Pantheon 
Books, 1980). 
8 Robert W. Cox, Reflections and Transitions in ROBERT W. COX WITH MICHAEL G. SCHECHTER, 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A PLURAL WORLD: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON POWER, MORALS AND 
CIVILIZATION 26-43, 37 (2002) 
9 JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES TOWARD A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY 33 (2015). 
10 JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DISAGREEMENT: POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 11 (Julie Rose, trans. 1999). 
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disadvantaged state due to ‘the fact that one’s life is always in some sense 
in the hands of the other.’11 With the ascendance of the neoliberal era, 
states are expected to be immunized from an ‘overload’ of fiscal demands 
placed upon them by citizens and interest groups.12 States are persuaded, 
instead, to open up markets, privatize public services, and give up on 
redistributing wealth. 13  The orders of IEL have emerged as constituent 
elements in this endeavor, promoting the spread of private economic power 
while turning a blind eye to its harsh outcomes, what we label its 
‘wreckage.’14 The plan of action, in short, has been to disarm states and to 
weaponize IEL. 
Key to the success of its programme is a rationale that renders this 
form of voluntary subordination tolerable. 15  The project is aided by 
invoking a legal rationale particular to the logic of the law of capitalism. It 
is the distinction between law and politics. Weber famously distinguished 
between formally rational law, which enabled markets to spread in the 
occident, and law that was tainted by substantive values, such as socialism 
or utilitarianism.16 It is the emphasis that Weber placed on depoliticized law 
that provides important discursive support for promoting the regimes of 
IEL.  
Our argument is that depoliticization makes it more difficult to 
ameliorate the conditions giving rise to precarity. While the orthodoxy in 
policy circles is that economic globalization generates a ‘rising tide’ that 
lifts all boats, what has transpired is both persistent inequality in national 
income between regions and a discernable rising of inequality within 
states.17 We address depoliticization claims in Part I: that states no longer 
have a legitimate role in managing trade and capital movements and that 
disagreement over their distributive consequences are to be emptied of 
politics. The end game is to naturalize and, thereby, internalize the 
depoliticization narrative. In Part II, we turn to a discussion of inequality by 
focussing upon inequalities of wealth and influence between and within 
                                                             
11 JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IN LIFE GRIEVABLE? 14 (2010). 
12 MICHEL J. CROZIER, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON & JOJI WATANUKI, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY: 
REPORT ON THE GOVERNABILITY OF DEMOCRACIES TO THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION  (New York 
University Press, 1975). 
13 ‘To get a grip on the problems of poverty, one should also forget the idea of overcoming 
inequality by distribution’ wrote an advisor to President Reagan. See GEORGE GILDER, 
WEALTH AND POVERTY 67 (1981). 
14  ‘Where a chain of events appear before us, he [the angel of history] sees one single 
catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at its feet’ in Walter 
Benjamin, ‘Thesis IX’ in LÖWY, supra note 1 at 62.  
15 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH 47 (Lysa Hochroth & Catherine Porter, trans. 
2007).  
16 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 657 (Gunther 
Roth & Claus Wittich eds, 2 volumes, University of California Press 1978). 
17 FACUNDO ALVEREDO ET AL., WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT 2018 65 (2017), 
http://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-full-report-english.pdf. 
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states. Our aim in these two parts is to elucidate linkages between 
depoliticization and the maintenance and reproduction of precarity. In Part 
III, we take up some basic elements of the hyper-specialized regimes of 
trade and investment law. In the course of describing their main features, 
we trace a trajectory common to each: global legal orders exhibiting a 
structural tilt that favours mobile economic wealth, precipitating legitimacy 
crises and kindred responses that aim to manage the fall out. Attempts at 
recalibrating trade and investment rules, however, have not managed so 
well at minimizing their deleterious effects. We conclude that, so long as 
schemes like IEL do not take inequality seriously, trade and investment 
rules will remain vulnerable to political blowback. 
 
I. Depoliticization 
Each of the regimes of trade and investment law commits states to 
behave in accordance with particular norms, anything beyond which is 
unacceptable and which results in the imposition of penalties. These 
regimes produce not soft law but hard law, interpreted and applied by 
international institutions, with variable enforcement mechanisms, 
rendering these regimes a formidable limit on state capacity. These legal 
regimes serve to separate politics from markets, having the effect of 
removing a variety of options from domestic policy tables which we 
associate with the movement toward ‘depoliticization.’ By depoliticization, 
we refer to processes ‘that remove or displace the potential for choice, 
collective agency, and deliberation around a particular political issue.’18 
Such laws, in short, preempt state action. Tactics of depoliticization 
distinguish between the promotion of rules that render markets calculable, 
predictable, and certain (rational law) and those which are labeled 
arbitrary, namely, those which result in new or ‘abnormal’ policy 
orientations (irrational law). Measures to promote social justice cannot, 
under this scheme, but be characterized as irrational and arbitrary.19  
Policing the separation between law and politics was not always the 
main priority of IEL. There were periods, particularly in the postwar era, 
when developed and developing states had more room to manouevre. They 
were permitted to take measures that economically powerful states 
themselves had adopted in the course of their own development. This is 
what Amsden labels the first American empire, when states experimented 
with policies like import substitution directed at developing nascent 
industry. 20  In this era, non-reciprocal rules of trade and investment 
                                                             
18 Paul Fawcett, Matthew Flinders, Colin Hay & Matthew Wood, Anti-Politics, 
Depoliticization, and Governance in ANTI-POLITICS, DEPOLITICIZATION, AND GOVERNANCE 3, 5 
(Paul Fawcett, Matthew Flinders, Colin Hay & Matthew Wood, eds. 2017). 
19 WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 59 (2014). 
20 ALICE H. AMSDEN, ESCAPE FROM EMPIRE: THE DEVELOPING WORLD’S JOURNEY THROUGH HEAVEN 
AND HELL (2007). 
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eschewed conventional assumptions about equal opportunities for growth 
in favour of a view of the global state system as economically unequal.21 
These rules were not only more flexible; the available flexibility also 
resulted in more just distributions. This is the period Ruggie refers to as 
the era of the ‘embedded liberalism compromise’ where ‘multilateralism 
would be predicated upon domestic interventionism.’22  
By the time of the second American empire, associated with the 
ascendance of privatization and deregulation promoted by international 
financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank, the developmental state 
was looked upon with disdain.23 Because of the insatiable demands being 
made upon social welfare states, of which they were incapable of 
delivering, there emerged a crisis of ‘ungovernability.’24 The only proper 
response was to disable states from having the capacity of responding 
other than through market mechanisms. States were expected to open up 
domestic markets to overseas goods, services and capital. Nothing less 
would be tolerated. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, this pressure only intensified. The resolution of distributional 
conflicts, in so far as they touched upon trade and investment, were 
removed to ‘organizational settings’ hard to reconcile with democratic 
theory.25 Instead, national democratic politics would turn their attention to 
other salient noneconomic issues.26  
The resulting governing paradigm, where nothing less than markets 
freed from having to respond to the demands of local citizenry is tolerable, 
emerged as hegemonic. Political contestation would be displaced by 
outcomes the market would have produced, facilitating the depoliticization 
of distributive outcomes. To this end, at the macro-political level, World 
Bank General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata declared that the Bank would assist 
states in developing their own laws so ‘long as it is based on considerations 
of economy and efficiency.’ 27  World Bank experts insisted upon legal 
                                                             
21 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Report of the 
Secretary General [Raúl Prebisch], Toward a New Trade Policy for Development in 
PROCEEDINGS OF UNCTAD (II) 1964 E/CONF.46/141, 18-19. 
22 John Gerald Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 393 (1982). 
23 AMSDEN, supra note 19. 
24 CROZIER, HUNTINGTON, WATANUKI, supra note 12 and Clause Offe, Ungovernability in 
FRAGILE STABILITÄT – STABILE FRAGILITÄT 77-87 (Stephan A. Jansen, Eckhard Schröter, and 
Nico Stehr, eds. 2013). 
25 Claus Offe, The Separation of Form and Content in Liberal Democracy in CLAUS OFFE, 
CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE 162, 167 (John Keane ed., 1984).  
26 Timothy Hellwig, Globalization, Policy Constraints, and Vote Choice, 70 THE JOURNAL OF 
POLITICS 1128 (2008). 
27 Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and ‘Governance’ Issues in Its Borrowing Members in 
IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS, VOL. 1 53-96, 86 
(1991).  
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frameworks that promoted market fundamentals. Other countervailing 
considerations would be off domestic policy agendas.  
Each of the legal frameworks of trade and investment exemplify this 
hegemonic discourse. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), resulting in the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), released states from having to reply upon ‘power-
oriented’ approaches in favour of ‘rule-oriented’ ones.28 Jackson likened 
this as a move away from the ‘state of nature’ to one of ‘civilization’ – a 
return to civilized justice, one could say. 29  For Jackson, what was 
neutralized was the power of hegemonic states relying upon coercive 
military might. Likewise, Shihata famously proclaimed that, with the 
establishment of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(the ICSID Convention), the result would be the depoliticization of 
investment disputes. 30  General Counsel to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Aaron Broches, similarly declared that 
ICSID would ‘insulate [investment] disputes from the realm of politics and 
diplomacy. 31  The ICSID approach to investment disputes consists in 
granting foreign investors the right to sue host states for damages before 
international arbitration tribunals. Such legal innovation remains at the 
core of what is known today as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).  
It is unfortunate that international lawyers would have recourse to 
this artifice when it was far from reality on the ground. What the WTO’s and 
ICSID’s founders meant to say is that the traditional means for resolving 
disputes in international law, namely via inter-state diplomacy, would be 
abandoned in favour of new institutional intermediaries enforcing rules 
intended to neutralize disagreement over market fundamentals. Disputes 
no longer would be subject to the political bargaining of locally elected 
officials responding to the inputs of their enfranchised citizenry. There also 
was a semblance of irreversibility to this transfer of power from below to 
above. Rather than being responsive to the demands of local populaces, 
enforcement mechanisms would bind citizens to rules of global good 
governance, those worthy of the appellation ‘universal.’ 
The aim was to naturalize depoliticization and its distributive 
outcomes in much the same way as has Ricardo’s hypothesis of 
                                                             
28 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 110-11 (2nd ed. 1997). 
29 See David Schneiderman, The Global Regime of Investor Rights: A Return to the Standards of 
Civilized Justice?, 5 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 60 (2014) and BENJAMIN ALLEN COATES, 
LEGALIST EMPIRE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2016). 
30 Ibrahim Shihata, Toward Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID 
and MIGA 1 ICSID Rev 1, 4 (1986).  
31 ICSID, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND 
NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE 
CONVENTION, VOL. II, PART I 242 (1968) (per Broches, December 16, 1963).  
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comparative advantage. 32  According to Ricardo’s simple formulation, 
states, like labouring individuals, should be expected to specialize in what 
they do best, e.g. textile production in England and wine production in 
Portugal. 33  Ricardo’s argument was that specialisation works to the 
comparative advantage of each nation – to ‘capitalists’ and to ‘consumers,’ 
which ‘diffuses to the general benefit.’34 It turns out that gains from trade 
do not ‘diffuse’ to everyone but benefit certain privileged interests.35 Nor 
does the theory match up well with successful paths to economic 
development. The evidence suggests that countries with a capacity to 
diversify are more likely to succeed economically rather than immediately 
specializing in industries in which there is some perceived advantage. It is 
only when countries are more highly developed that the advantages of 
specialization accrue to states and citizens.36 
Ricardo overlooked important factors too, for instance, that 
comparative advantage requires that each country accept the production 
methods and labour standards of the other even if in violation of social 
norms in the importing country.37 He also misled about capital mobility. He 
described the insecurity of capital (‘fancied or real’), together with a 
‘natural disinclination to quit the country of his birth and connexions, and 
intrust himself with all his habits fixed, to a strange government and new 
laws,’ as having the effect of ‘check[ing] the emigration of capital.’38 Yet 
English capital was, at the time, seeking new markets for its increased 
output,39 including controlling the production and trading of Portuguese 
wine.40  Comparative advantage, nonetheless, is the central peg around 
which modern trade orthodoxy hangs.  
Depoliticized law results in the naturalization of these and other 
policy choices, unleashing the political power of multinational firms. 
Economic power thereby translates into political power. The challenge for 
critical scholars of law is to identify how these choices are made and then 
normalised. International trade and investment lawyers prefer that we 
                                                             
32 Mill described Ricardo’s ‘doctrine [as] now universally received by political economists’ 
in JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO 
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 348, fn. (Longmans Green & Co. 1911 [1848]). 
33 DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 135 (Piero Saffra 
ed. 1951 [1817]). 
34 Id. at 136. 
35 Dani Rodrik, The Great Globalisation Lie PROSPECT MAGAZINE (January 2018), 
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-great-globalisation-lie-economics-
finance-trump-brexit. 
36 DANI RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 103 (2007). 
37 DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 34 (1997). 
38 RICARDO, supra note 32, at 136. 
39 SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY 47-51, 76 (Vintage 2015). 
40 L. M. E. SHAW, THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE AND THE ENGLISH MERCHANTS IN PORTUGAL 
1654–1810 141-57 (2017). 
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overlook this partiality, in favour of rules having abstract and universal 
forms. They appeal, for instance, to the seemingly unobjectionable 
principle of national treatment or non-discrimination in the GATT. It means 
that every member of the WTO has the same abstract right to export and to 
import goods. The principle is one of formal equality and overlooks what 
states can export or import or whether they can export or import anything 
at all. While the principles of non-discrimination and gains form trade 
appear universally appealing, they cannot have universal effects on the 
ground.41  
There are, admittedly, special rules in some areas for countries in 
Global South (called ‘special and differential treatment’). For the most 
part, however, the abstract principle of non-discrimination disregards the 
legacy of past imposed or unfair choices. This means that, in practice, 
countries in the Global North focus on high-skilled activities while Global 
South countries dedicate themselves to low-skilled labour. The GATT 
members’ tariff commitments also favour the production of raw materials 
in the Global South and manufacturing of those resources in the Global 
North. These outcomes are encouraged by tariffs that increase to the 
extent that value is added to imported products (known as tariff 
escalation). It is in the interests of more economically powerful states that 
the average Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) country tariff on imports from developing countries is four times 
higher than imports from other OECD countries.42 These tariffs operate as 
inducements for producing cocoa and coffee beans in the Global South and 
manufacturing chocolate and coffee in the Global North.43  
Such inducements are given even clearer expression in international 
investment law. The field is premised on the idea that foreign investment is 
good for development and that mitigation of political risk is required to lure 
investors. Foreign investors therefore require special protections, such as 
national treatment because, after mixing (in Lockean fashion) 44  their 
ownership advantages with local resources, they are at the mercy of host 
                                                             
41 Particularly in light of the legacies of colonialism. According to Peer Vries, “what 
occurred in the nineteenth century with Western industrialization and imperialism was not 
simply a changing of the guard. What emerged was a gap between rich and poor nations, 
powerful and powerless nations, that was unprecedented in world history” (emphasis in the 
original). PEER VRIES, ESCAPING POVERTY: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH 46 (2013).  
42 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, FAIR TRADE FOR ALL: HOW TRADE CAN PROMOTE 
DEVELOPMENT 47 (2005). 
43 See Nasredin Elamin & Hansdeep Khaira, Tariff escalation in agricultural commodity 
markets FAO COMMODITY MARKET REVIEW 101 (2003-2004). 
44 For a critical discussion of the influence of Lockean theories of property in foreign 
investor rights, see Nicolás M. Perrone, The Emerging Global Right to Investment: 
Understanding the Reasoning behind Foreign Investor Rights, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 673 (2017). 
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state political forces (the so-called ‘obsolescing bargain’).	45 Foreign capital 
turns out not to be so vulnerable, according to empirical analyses. Relying 
upon World Bank data that draws on the experience of companies 
operating in 80 countries during the period 1999-2000, Aisbett finds that 
foreign firms are ‘no more or less influential’ than domestic firms and that 
‘both foreign and domestic multinationals are significantly more influential’ 
than other firms.46 This is not to say that states do not behave badly, only 
that large data sets do not support the obsolescing hypothesis. Nor do 
signing treaties often result in development outcomes favourable to host 
states. In a 2014 survey of 301 senior executives in companies with more 
than US$ 1 billion in annual revenue, respondents indicated that the 
existence of BITs were of far less importance in making investment 
decisions than the character of host state laws.47 A meta-analysis of the 
existing empirical evidence exploring the correlation between signing BITs 
and attracting foreign direction investment (FDI) indicates that their effects 
appear to be ‘economically negligible.’48  
We maintain that the rules and institutions of IEL are intended to 
discourage, if not outlaw, policy options lying outside the range of what is 
considered ‘normal.’ The object, ‘first and foremost,’ writes Lang, is to 
discredit ‘the idea that economic governance ought to involve the 
mobilization and pursuit of collective goals and values.’ The rise of imperial 
bureaucracies gives way to control by ‘formal-technical governance, 
working through general legal principles, interpreted and applied in concert 
with technical knowledge,’ he writes.49 All of which is aimed at dampening 
social and political imaginaries. The object is to internalize depoliticization. 
Politics is not to be conducted on the premise that ‘here the people rule’ 
but, instead, that ‘we are open for business.’ It signals not only governance 
without the people, but government without politics.50  
It might be assumed that the object of IEL regimes is to constrain 
policy options to only those that metropolitan economic actors will tolerate. 
                                                             
45  RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 47 
(1971). 
46 Emma Aisbett, Powerful Multinational or Persecuted Foreigners: ‘Foreignness’ and Influence 
Over Government, Australian National University (Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper No. 638 19, April 2010). 
47 Hogan Lovells et al., Risk and Return: Foreign Direct Investment and the Rule of Law (2015) 
41, http://f.datasrvr.com/fr1/415/10099/10071_D4_FDI_Main_Report_V4.pdf. The 
survey results also indicated that the existence of a BIT affected investment decisions, 
which is hard to square with the fact that ‘answers to other questions showed that they 
had indeed made investment in … regions … [where] no BITs were present’ (id. at 47).  
48 Christian Bellak, Economic Impact of Investment Agreements Department of Economics, 
Vienna University of Economics and Business (Working Paper No. 200, 19, 2015), 
https://epub.wu.ac.at/4625/1/wp200.pdf. 
49 ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER 7 (2011). 
50 JACQUES RANCIÈRE, HATRED OF DEMOCRACY 80 (Steve Corcoran, trans. 2006). 
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This suggests that not all programmes for egalitarian redistribution will be 
ruled out of order,51 rather, only those that are deemed unacceptable to 
actors operating at the centre of the world trading and investment system. 
Something more, however, is expected from states in the periphery. They 
are not permitted to initiate policies that these states used ‘to get where 
they are now.’52 It becomes a matter, as Chang puts it, of ‘kicking away the 
ladder’ that home state governments climbed in order to secure their own 
economic success.53  Even then, mostly similar policy initiatives will be 
more closely scrutinized if issuing out of states in the periphery than in the 
core. Financial markets, for instance, are more sensitive and respond to a 
wider range of indicators in developing than in developed countries. This 
disparity of treatment grants to latter states ‘wider latitude to pursue a 
variety of policy objectives.’54 The trick is to have the institutions of IEL 
apply rules in ways that do not precipitate a backlash within the powerful 
states that define the content of those rules. 
Yet there remains an instability generated by the law’s distributive 
functions, even within the ‘civilized’ states of the OECD. Legal strategies, it 
turns out, are not so successful in separating out what are legitimate from 
illegitimate policy options. There must, of necessity, be room for discretion 
built into these instruments that allow for the determination of what is in 
the common good. In most developed states property, for instance, is 
heavily regulated even though property rights might be entrenched 
constitutionally.55 For this reason, exercises of policy discretion will remain 
deeply contested. Political disagreement inevitably will arise as these 
conflicts get played out at the transnational stage. To label the rules and 
processes of IEL as depoliticized misses this point entirely. 
 
II. Inequality 
The economic and legal terrain has changed since Ricardo’s time. 
Yet the gains from trade and investment, even when premised upon the 
equality of states, continue to cause social suffering. According to Pascal 
Lamy, former Director General of the WTO, trade ‘works because it is 
painful… [b]ut the pain is more poignant for the weak.’ ‘Appropriate 
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policies,’ he acknowledges, ‘are thus needed for social justice.’ 56  The 
mechanics of free trade and investment provide cheaper and better 
products but only after allocating pain in notably unequal amounts. The 
preferences we formalise in trade and investment treaties generate 
precarity and contribute to inequality of wealth by creating ‘losers’ who are 
expected to catch up, often on their own, with global economic patterns.57 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for instance, was a 
choice in favour of shifting manufacturing from the United States and 
Canada to Mexico. As Baldwin explains, this choice brought about a nearly 
unbeatable team consisting of US technology and cheap Mexican labour. 
The notable losers were the labour forces of the United States and Canada. 
These workers require either retraining, where available, or reliance upon 
subsistence benefits at poverty levels.58 What occurred can be described as 
the ‘peripheralization of the labour force’ at the core of the global 
economy.59  
 Similar outcomes can be seen in other places with comprehensive 
free trade agreements (FTAs) that include investment chapters. These 
agreements promote the offshoring of production to locales where labour is 
cheaper. Many proponents purport to take a global view and describe the 
loss of jobs as a trade-off for more jobs and better salaries in the Global 
South.60 But the evidence to date is not as convincing as proponents might 
think. It is true that overall inequality between states has declined, 
principally because of economic growth in China and, to a lesser extent, in 
India.61 Nevertheless, inequality within most states, even within developed 
ones, has increased dramatically and shows no signs of easing off.62 For 
many populations suffering as a consequence of these processes, the 
problem appears to be that the pain inflicted by these new circumstances 
appears to have no end in sight. 
 The premise that states and peoples need to continuously adjust to 
global markets makes sense to most economists, who focus on economic 
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growth and trade-offs.63 They purport to do value free empirical work with 
little or no appreciation of social costs, however. The problem, Rodrik 
observes, ‘is that mainstream economics shades too easily into ideology, 
constraining the choices that we appear to have and providing cookie-cutter 
solutions.’64 It is imperative, therefore, that legal scholars remain attentive 
to the role of law and the legal profession in contributing to the spreading 
tentacles of inequality. If the economics profession appears less concerned 
with the distributive consequences of legal rules, the same should not be 
said of lawyers who like to speak in the language of ‘fairness’ and ‘justice.’  
 Yet, it seems as if lawyers are shying away from the debate on 
inequality. This is not good news for the precarious. Those economists who 
take inequality seriously conclude that politics, law, and institutions are 
determinative in either exacerbating or easing inequality. Piketty notes that 
‘[w]henever one speaks about the distribution of wealth, politics is never 
very far behind.’65 Similarly, Milanovic reminds us that ‘[m]ost political 
battles are fought over the distribution of income.’66 Rather than removing 
distributive questions from law and politics, they remain perpetually at the 
heart of contemporary social struggles. These struggles take place in the 
context of an economic and technological environment that has 
dramatically changed in the past few decades. This does not alter the 
political nature of distributional struggles, however. New technologies 
create economic gains and actors struggle to exclude others from these 
gains. 
 The social and political preferences that shape global distribution are 
the consequence of these battles. To focus on these battles, it is important 
to reconsider our approach to IEL. For one, this requires understanding 
each rule and its interpretation as a move in a broader terrain where 
different actors struggle for economic gain and control over the content of 
rules that govern their distribution. For another, the struggle is dynamic: 
each battle occurs in the shadow of previous victories and defeats. ‘Over 
time,’ writes Kennedy, ‘victories and defeats on the terrain of law add up, 
reproducing patterns of empowerment and disempowerment.’ 67  These 
previous outcomes are distributive in material and in political terms. The 
final prizes are not merely economic gains but the possibilities for politics.  
As for the content of these depoliticized rules, as we suggest above, 
their substance largely is determined by those having the power and 
prestige to be invited to the table to participate in defining the rules of the 
game. This is a much smaller club than usually is acknowledged and 
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contributes to an inequality of influence. It is ‘global’ only to the extent that 
the strategic sites for global calculation are almost exclusively the 
privileged actors within regions and states of the Global North. It is, after 
all, the law of those states that gets taken up and represented as 
‘universal’ standards that make up international law. These actors present 
their positions in the form of expert knowledge, namely, abstract, universal 
and depoliticized knowledge. This manoeuvre reflects an inequality in 
power/knowledge – an inequality in producing the regimes of truth that are 
considered reliable and trustworthy.68 States and their representatives, for 
this reason, are not disinterested in the outcome of the competition over 
who gets to name the content of the universal.69 They, instead, have an 
interest in labeling the law of their rival competitors as ‘local,’ giving 
expression only to chauvinistic preferences, in contrast to those values 
labeled universal and representing global rules for good governance.70 The 
local and the partial are relegated to ‘social forms of non-existence,’ 
observes Santos, ‘because the realities to which they give shape are 
present only as obstacles vis-à-vis the realities deemed relevant.’ 71  By 
parading legal particulars as universal standards, international economic 
regimes not only serve particular local interests, they perpetuate the 
inequality accorded to those denied the ability of making a contribution. 
States thereby are restructured. If, as Polanyi explains, states are 
fundamental to the success of markets, 72 then the realignment of states 
generated by neoliberal rationality produces a more narrowly cast agenda 
that can create conflict between international commitments and domestic 
political ones. 73  Gradually, however, the realignment of states serves 
precisely to control this conflict and occlude alternative choices. As Sassen 
explains, the increasing relevance of trade and investment disciplines has 
changed the organisation of authority within states. It is not that states are 
not sovereign anymore but that this sovereignty is now organised 
differently.74 Global capital has made claims on national states,’ she writes, 
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‘which have responded through the production of new forms of legality.’75 
As competition for trade and capital grows, states ‘shed some powers, but 
take [] on others.’76 Trade ministries now rule the roost as they surveil other 
ministries, ensuring they do not act in violation of international trade and 
investment commitments. These changes reciprocally influence both 
internal and external relations. Trade and investment facilitation initiatives 
are a good example of this. The rules on facilitation aim to improve 
business climate and facilitate trade. Designated state agencies, 
consequently, bend over backwards to attract new economic activity by 
adopting what are considered best practices.77 The rest of the population is 
expected to fend for themselves as they face similar, if not higher, barriers 
to accessing benefits, medical treatment or pensions. Though premised on 
the idea of level playing fields, the terrain of economic globalization is 
tilted, privileging those already having an advantage.  
 This can be observed in the fields of trade and investment, which 
prompt a process of export and FDI-led restructuring of states. When it is 
determined that each country should focus on those goods and services 
that it produces efficiently, exporters gain a vital advantage over other 
domestic actors contributing to the inequality within states. Once a country 
signs a trade agreement, exporters have an incentive to invest and hire 
labour. Exporting sectors grow beyond the needs of the domestic market in 
their desire to supply global markets. This creates an inherent tension. As 
countries become more dependent on their exporting sectors, these sectors 
increasingly operate according to international determinants of prices and 
incentives. For the losers, the opposite is the case: they lose political 
influence. On occasion, the cost is higher than the closure of local 
businesses. In the case of food, cheap imports come at the cost of not only 
jobs but of food security.  
By admitting rice and corn imports under the WTO’s Agreement on 
Agriculture, not only did rice production in the Philippines substantially 
decline, corn production was ‘wiped out.’78 The dairy and edible oil sectors 
in India have been destroyed and replaced by a flood of cheap imports and 
substitutes.79 High commodity prices results in a shift towards large-scale 
export-oriented agriculture and ensuing domestic food shortages. The 
Agreement on Agriculture, after all, was structured by Northern states and 
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works mostly to privilege Northern interests. 80  After unregulated trade 
triggered a food crisis in 2008, states began to rethink priorities, choosing 
food security and local production over access to global markets. This has 
led to a renewed focus on the agricultural trade agenda and the ability to 
raise limits on stockpiled food for security purposes as an aspect of special 
and differential treatment. An interim agreement was reached in 2013, 
permitting stockpiled increases above previously allotted amounts. 81 
Because of its ‘trade distorting’ effects, however, these measures have not 
been made permanent due to U.S. opposition.82 
 Large foreign investors enjoy similar advantages in this uneven 
playing field. States are expected to rely upon foreign investment in order 
to exploit natural resources and generate jobs. The rules that favour foreign 
over domestic investment, given expression in bilateral investment treaties, 
contribute to creating an overreliance on foreign investment. Discussing the 
importance of Global Value Chains (GVCs) in improving development 
outcomes, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) insists that many states ‘may not have a choice.’83 They must 
make efforts to join these GVCs and climb the value ladder. Attracting 
foreign investment as well as increasing exports, UNCTAD maintains, are 
important to achieving macroeconomic stability and internal peace. But 
these objectives can come at the cost of land grabbing, over-exploitation of 
natural resources (‘neo-extractivism’) and precarious work. If these policies 
appear to be voluntarily embraced by states they, in fact, are only ‘choices’ 
made under the constraints imposed by prior victories and defeats on the 
trade and investment terrain.84 
 The interplay between inequality and depoliticization is both material 
and epistemological. The result is predictability and flexibility for some and 
precarity for others. Actors struggle over the gains of trade and investment 
in ways that reinforce the narrative of depoliticization. As we discuss below, 
taking measures that speak in overtly political terms increases the odds of 
                                                             
80 MATTHEW EAGLETON-PIERCE, SYMBOLIC POWER IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 130 (OUP 
2013). 
81 World Trade Organization, Public stockholding for food security purposes (Ministerial 
Decision of 7 December 2013), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/desci38_e.htm. 
82 Indian Express, What is the food stockpiling issue at the WTO? (December 13, 2017),  
http://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/what-is-the-food-stockpiling-issue-at-the-wto-
4980749/. Also Michael Fakhri, A History of Food Security and Agriculture In International 
Trade Law, 1945-2015 in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: NEW VOICES, NEW PERSPECTIVES 
(Akbar Rasulov & John Haskell eds. 2018). 
83 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: 
GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT xi, xxiv (2013).  
84 Some of these constraints and their implications are discussed in more detail in Nicolás 
M. Perrone, UNCTAD's World Investment Reports 1991-2015: 25 Years of Narratives Justifying 
and Balancing Foreign Investor Rights, 19 JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 1 (2018). 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186179 
 16 
losing trade and investment disputes. Social and political preferences have 
more chances when they are planned, described and implemented in a 
seemingly depoliticised, expert manner that mimics the behaviour of 
private economic actors. We have also argued that previous victories and 
defeats constitute a terrain that occludes other social and political 
imaginaries. Certain arguments, certain ways of thinking, are forbidden. 
For the precarious, the regimes of IEL place them firmly at the margins. 
 
III. Rules 
The rules and institutions of IEL are productive in a number of 
different ways. They, first, govern the world of legal possibilities – they aim 
to narrow the spectrum of policy options to those deemed to fall within the 
range of the normal and acceptable. They also, second, have distributive 
consequences that favour some interests over others. If we understand 
legal regimes of IEL as exhibiting a ‘strategic selectivity,’85 they enhance 
the conditions of those privileged by its distributive tilt while rendering 
those outside the ambit of its concern as precarious. In Butler’s account, 
they ‘maximize precariousness for some and minimize precariousness for 
others.’86 Following upon this last feature, the legal regimes of IEL produce 
the conditions giving rise to the regime’s own legitimacy problems, even 
crises. In this section, we trace the outlines of two cognate regimes of IEL 
in order to disclose their structural tilt, ensuing legitimacy crises, and the 
responses of legal agents seeking to manage the fall out. In the course of 
doing so, we hope to show how policy choices are significantly constrained 
in order to favour mobile economic wealth. In Bentham’s apt phrasing, 
there are state policy options that remain on the agenda while others are 
non-agenda items – these are options that continue to be treated as beyond 
the pale.87  
A critical international political economy approach suggests that the 
constraints produced by these two regimes are not strictly technical, nor 
unavoidable. Rather, they are contingent and perpetually political. Their 
objectives are enhanced by allied governance institutions and dispute 
settlement bodies. They include global governance institutions dedicated to 
producing qualitative and quantitative indicators that contribute to state 
compliance with the rules of IEL.88 Among them, the WTO regularly reviews 
the trade policies of its member states through its Trade Policy Review 
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Mechanism. The OECD and UNCTAD assess the investment policies of 
selected countries. The World Bank has popularized the use of quantitative 
indicators via its Investing Across Borders and Doing Business initiatives. Not 
only international organisations, but private institutions generate vital data 
about state behaviour. Credit rating agencies, for instance, ascertain 
sovereign credit risk and the likelihood that states will default on their debt. 
These agencies are also more interested in scrutinizing the behaviour of 
developing than developed states. 89  Overall, these public and private 
institutions set the table for the regimes of IEL. Few states can be 
indifferent to the information they produce as that data purports to shape 
trade and investment flows. 
Despite increasing interest in indicators and governance, most 
scholarship has focused on the rules and institutions of IEL, undertaking 
detailed examination of the decisions of trade and investment dispute 
panels. These are worthwhile endeavours, as these details do matter. While 
we discuss selected cases below, we are not preoccupied with parsing their 
finer points. As Koskenniemi reminds us, the problem is not with the cases 
but with the system.90 In which case, we undertake this analysis not for the 
purpose of bringing legitimacy to the regimes of IEL but to situate them in 
the larger project of repoliticizing IEL thereby rendering its distributive 
consequences more vulnerable to contestation. 
 In undertaking these detailed analyses of the jurisprudence, 
mainstream scholars typically focus on IEL interactions with other systems, 
typically having to do with the environment, health or human rights (the so-
called ‘linkages’ debate). The research question often asked is whether 
there is regulatory chill or policy shifts resulting from either cognizance of 
the rules or from pending or resolved disputes. While we discuss the 
problem of the ‘right to regulate’ below, we are of the view that a focus on 
linkages misses the point. Framing the current debate in IEL through a 
sovereign right to regulate elides the fundamental question of what sort of 
regulatory imagination remains possible under regimes fashioned by a 
dominant political frame that aspires to unfettered economic freedom.  
In contrast to rules intended to facilitate equality and social justice – 
those that better attend to the needs of the precarious – the rules and 
institutions of IEL are designed to remove barriers to international trade 
and investment flows. These forms of legality turn out not to give rise to 
many concerns on the part of most IEL scholars. Such legal innovations are 
rarely characterized as amounting to regulatory interventions in markets, 
despite the fact that they constitute regulatory givings (in contrast to 
regulatory takings) that facilitate business activities.91 Most of the trade 
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and investment literature concerns itself, instead, with states’ ability to 
curb negative externalities, address market failures and defend normative 
preferences embedded in local standards. The degree to which these run 
up against the systemic logic of IEL is the main preoccupation of scholars 
and dispute settlement bodies.  
On the other hand, the terms of this debate have remained quite 
irresponsive to the demand for measures to protect the precarious, those 
harmed by global economic expansion, western imperialism or 
colonialism.92 Such measures might be aimed at protecting indigenous 
lands or campesino property rights or having the effect of redistributing 
wealth to those who are disadvantaged by the regime’s binding strictures. 
Similarly, the linkages and right to regulate debates have overlooked the 
possibility of opening up the policy toolkit of less wealthy states to catch up 
with the richer nations, to restore the ladder of development, so to speak. 
The discussion of WTO flexibility to promote new (or old) development 
policies is relegated to a marginal place in most trade law textbooks, which 
only briefly discuss measures that allow for special and differential 
treatment.93 The general contours of the right to regulate, which overlook 
these other regulatory possibilities, are symptomatic of the significant role 
that IEL plays in normalising rules that favour historic winners over historic 
losers, both between and within states. In order to fill out the contours of 
IEL regimes, we turn next to a discussion of the content of two of its 
principal legal orders, those of trade and investment. Given the breadth of 
the subjects that could be covered, the discussion is meant only to be 
illustrative.  
 
A. World Trade Law 
Prior to the establishment of the WTO, trading rules under the GATT 
were enforced through inter-state diplomacy. With the finalization of the 
Uruguay Round GATT in 1995, a new dispute settlement mechanism was 
initiated based on the ‘rule of law’ and lawyers. It consists of an initial 
Panel to investigate and report on disputes and an Appellate Body to hear 
appeals against Panel reports. Crucially, under the rule of negative 
consensus, WTO members must accept these decisions unless there is a 
consensus against it.  
At the height of the ‘roaring nineties,’ outcomes in trade disputes 
were unabashedly about the primacy of markets over politics. The first 
dispute panel and Appellate Body reports emphasized the priority of 
eliminating market distortions, relying on the marketplace as the 
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benchmark to decide vital legal questions. This is best illustrated by 
turning to interpretations of national treatment (the principle of non-
discrimination) and, in particular, the interpretation of ‘likeness.’94 Trading 
rules are organised around the idea of non-discrimination and the 
prohibition of protectionism. Disputes resolved during the 1980s and 
1990s, however, shifted the emphasis from curbing protectionism to 
upholding the requisite ‘predictability needed to plan future trade’95 and 
protecting the ‘expectations of competitive opportunities.’96 No matter the 
meritorious purposes motivating any given policy, if resulting in 
discriminatory effects, it would run afoul GATT Article I and III. What was of 
interest to dispute settlement bodies was whether a measure impeded 
competition from ‘like’ products – a determination that was to be made 
with reference almost exclusively to market factors. Another, more 
deferential, line of authority associated with ‘aims and effects’ briefly made 
an appearance in this period. This mode of inquiry evaluates the measure 
in light of the policy’s aims and effects. These decisions looked to the 
public purpose sought to be achieved as a crucial factor in assessing the 
measure’s discriminatory effects.97 
The dominant mode of interpretation, which favoured the rights of 
traders over other public policy rationales, precipitated a backlash in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, exemplified by street protests at the 1999 
WTO ministerial meetings in Seattle. By way of response, the WTO 
Appellate Body in 2001 suggested, in passing, that non-market factors 
could be significant in determining issues of ‘likeness.’ 98  This was 
developed in subsequent reports, where both the Panel and Appellate Body 
focused on whether the effects of a measure were the result of legitimate 
policy goals or, instead, were disguised restrictions on trade based on a 
product’s foreign origins.99 Mere market distortion was now insufficient to 
                                                             
94 E.g. GATT Article III, paragraphs 2 and 4 where the comparison is to ‘like domestic 
products.’  
95 Panel Report, United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, BISD 
34S/136, adopted on 17 June 1987, para. 5.2.2. 
96 Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS75/R and WT/DS84/R, 
adopted 17 February 1999, para. 10.92. 
97 This second approach was accepted in two disputes against the United States, and in 
favour of this country, but was rejected by the WTO in Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/ AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 
November 1996. See Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, 11, 
unadopted, 11 October 1994; Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and 
Malt Beverages, DS23/R, adopted 19 June 1999. 
98 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 100 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Asbestos].  
99 Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005, para. 96; Panel report, 
European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186179 
 20 
engage WTO rules on national treatment. Required now was a 
determination that there was discrimination based on product origins. If, 
by so doing, the WTO Appellate Body appeared to be relaxing scrutiny of 
restrictions on trade, it did little to disturb the logic of the system of global 
trading rules. States were expected to open their borders to traders. Some 
policy aims would be tolerated – many would not. All of it would be subject 
to the oversight of trade lawyers.  
A second response prompted by the legitimacy crisis that 
accompanied the rise of the WTO focused on the general exceptions clause 
in Article XX. This clause allows WTO members to discriminate against like 
products, enabling the breach of GATT Articles I and III, if ‘necessary’ to 
achieve a closed list of non-trade goals, such as the protection of public 
morals, or the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. Not 
included among general exceptions are those measures that might be 
characterized as advancing social justice – measures, for example, that are 
designed to enhance local employment opportunities or further the goal of 
economic redistribution. If the general exceptions clause was meant to tilt 
the inquiry in favour of public interest measures that deviate from trade 
strictures, the necessity test gave rise to the strictest of scrutiny. WTO 
institutions interpreted the clause as requiring that states adopt the least 
trade restrictive alternative. After all, as we have learned from similar 
inquiries undertaken by apex courts, it is quite easy for judges to imagine 
less restrictive alternatives. This precipitated all sorts of second-guessing, 
even rejecting the advice of the World Health Organization on best 
practices to reduce cigarette smoking.100 
Recognizing that strict scrutiny would not relieve the WTO of 
lingering legitimacy concerns, more recent Appellate Body reports have 
relaxed the requirement of necessity. In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body 
crafted a balancing test similar to a three-step proportionality inquiry.101 In 
later cases, the Appellate Body even abandoned the last, overall balancing 
step of proportionality. In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body noted that 
WTO members have the freedom to decide the level of protection they want 
concerning public morals, life or heath.102 Even as dispute bodies vacillated 
between strict and loose interpretations of general exceptions, the 
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Appellate Body also has shown an interest, as indicated in its 1998 US – 
Shrimp decision,103 in ensuring that due process has been accorded to 
foreigners. This turn to process, as in the turn to proportionality, is 
intended to underscore that dispute settlement review under the WTO is 
neutral, impartial, and focussed on the means rather than on the 
substantive ends states choose to pursue. Yet, an emphasis on process 
disguises the values that are at stake. While the WTO appears not wanting 
to impose its own preferences when weighing those values, it necessarily 
takes sides. As Lang observes, even if preoccupied with process, ‘there is 
no conceivable way that WTO review can be neutral as to the substance of 
domestic regulation in anything but a trivial sense.’104 This is underscored 
by the emphasis accorded to Article XX’s chapeau, which directs dispute 
settlement bodies to remain attentive to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination’ and to ‘disguised restrictions on international trade.’ Given 
the few instances in which Article XX has been successfully invoked, the 
balance remains firmly in favour of trader’s rights.105  
For developing countries, in addition, any flexibility in the GATT or 
other WTO agreements is weakened by the expectation that they adopt the 
standards of the developed world. As trade disciplines move from tariff to 
non-tariff barriers, there is increasing awareness that access to developed 
country markets requires compliance with environmental, health and 
technical standards set out in the latter jurisdictions.106 Litigation over 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures in the WTO suggests that only rich 
countries, such as the United States and the EU, can afford to have 
different standards. For Global South countries, most will lack the 
resources to produce scientific evidence to either protect their standards or 
challenge those of other members. Global South countries, in this regard, 
can only aspire to receive technical advice to adapt to the standards of the 
Global North. In the meantime, local producers on the ground increasingly 
struggle to comply with private standards defined by global value chains or 
large multinational corporations.107 
Despite these problems, a triumphalist narrative has taken hold in 
trade law circles in recent years. Whatever legitimacy crisis imperilled the 
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trading regime had been vanquished by reason of the successful 
judicialization of trade disputes. The Appellate Body had become the 'jewel 
in the crown' of the WTO.108 As is often the case in the WTO’s short life, this 
state of affairs would not remain static. Trade insiders are, at present, 
worried about paralysis in WTO negotiations and attacks by the U.S. upon 
the Appellate Body. As to the former, the WTO has made very little 
progress in furthering the multilateral trade agenda because of a ‘too 
politicized’ process and overly complex agenda.109 In respect of the latter, 
the Trump administration has blocked the appointment of new members, 
putting at risk the functioning of the WTO’s judicial functions. At this pace, 
there is a likelihood that the Appellate Body will not have enough members 
to function properly or at all. Though the situation is turning critical, these 
problems predate President Trump’s election. In 2016, the Obama 
administration expressed concerns with the Appellate Body’s tendency to 
‘make law,’ accusing its members of using appeals ‘as an occasion to write 
a treatise on a WTO agreement.’110  
This complaint about ‘making law’ is a mantra familiar to 
conservative legal discourse in the U.S. Critical legal theorists, however, 
long have emphasized that the distinction between interpreting and making 
law is unstable and that ‘judicial activism’ is a character trait of common 
law judging.111 It is unsurprising to learn that investment tribunals, tasked 
with evaluating investor claims against host states, similarly seized the 
opportunity to exercise typical judicial functions by filling in the content of 
laconic treaty text. In the course of so doing, tribunals have developed a 
body of law that is expansive in its reach, precipitating numerous 
legitimacy problems. We turn next to a discussion of these latitudinarian 
tendencies and consequent developments.  
 
B. World Investment Law 
This companion global legal order largely is the product of 
thousands of bilateral investment treaties signed in the two decades after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Over three thousand currently are in force having 
as their object the protection of foreign investors and their investments. 
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States thereby commit to: non-discrimination (national treatment and most 
favoured nation), not impeding the transfer of funds, not imposing 
performance requirements (prohibiting preferences for local labour or 
services), not taking measures amounting to direct or indirect 
expropriation (not without full and immediately realizable compensation), 
and commitments to provide treatment in accordance with the minimum 
standard available under international law together with fair and equitable 
treatment (FET). The absolute, rather than relative, standards of 
expropriation and FET, which we discuss below, have emerged as core 
disciplines in international investment law. Most investment tribunals are 
responding to claims that either or both of these standards have been 
violated by host states. 
As in the case of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, most standards of 
protection have been authored by powerful capital exporting states, often 
times drawing upon their own legal standards of protection. As the United 
States Trade Representative put it, the US has not lost an investment 
dispute because its protections mirror those rights protected under its Bill 
of Rights.112 This is what the US Congress ordered the executive branch to 
provide once Congress realized, in 2002, that the standards of protection 
in the event of an expropriation clearly exceeded standards provided in the 
US constitution.113 The President was directed to negotiate new treaties 
incorporating the multi-factor analysis identified by the US Supreme Court 
in Penn Central that helps determine when a regulation rises to a 
compensable taking. 114  Many other national states, and even regional 
political units like the EU, have followed suit, seemingly unaware that they 
are promoting US constitutional law as global law. 115 It has been the case, 
then, that states in the Global South mostly have been rule takers rather 
than rule makers. According to Poulsen, many countries signed 
agreements seemingly unaware of their effects on regulatory space, 116 a 
puzzling fact given the long history of resistance to the content of 
international law promoted by countries of the North Atlantic.   
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when investors succeeded in their 
claims before investment tribunals, arbitrators seemed focussed upon 
                                                             112 United States Trade Representative, The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, TRADEWINDS: 
The Official Blog of the United States Trade Representative (March 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-
Safeguarding-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors. 
113 See DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 80-83 (2013). 
114 See Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1977). Those 
factors include the character of the measure, its duration, economic impact and extent to 
which it upsets investor expectations.  
115 Annex X. 11 in CETA. 
116 This story is told in LAUGE SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC 
DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (CUP 2015). 
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investor impacts, above all else. This was exemplified by a mode of 
analysis, developed in adjudicating expropriation claims, labelled as ‘sole 
effects’ doctrine.117 In these cases, arbitrators were preoccupied with the 
effects of a measure upon an investment rather than upon any public policy 
rationales that were offered in support. The ‘government’s intention is less 
important than the effects of the measure’ on the investor,’ the tribunal 
wrote in Tecmed.118 The investment tribunal in Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, for 
instance, decided that the measure at issue, which aimed at preserving the 
rainforest environment, constituted an indirect expropriation as it  
‘deprived the owner of his rights or has made those rights practically 
useless.’ Even where measures are ‘beneficial to society as a whole – such 
as environmental protection,’ the tribunal concluded, the obligation to pay 
compensation remains.119  It is not that arbitrators simply could ignore 
policy rationales. Rather, those rationales would be subsumed under 
investor effects or simply be dismissed as being driven by ‘politics.’ States 
were not permitted to behave politically but, instead, were expected to 
behave, and rewarded if they so behaved, in ways expected of rational 
economic actors.120 Excising politics from state calculations enabled the 
regime’s defenders to cast investment law as a legitimate constraint upon 
state action.  
Given the impossibility of achieving such a state of anti-politics, 
some of these awards raised alarm bells for those country negotiators who 
had failed to appreciate the regime’s muscularity. Nor could states, on the 
other hand, lose too often. Such an outcome would almost immediately 
heighten legitimacy concerns and deepen suspicion about the regime’s 
structural tilt. There is some disagreement over the data but, according to 
UNCTAD, states prevail in 36.6 per cent of the cases while foreign investors 
win in only 26.9 per cent (in the so-called ‘merits phase’ of an 
arbitration).121 It is harder to account for settlements that, according to 
UNCTAD, occur in approximately 23.5 per cent of the disputes. We 
surmise, as do others, that a significant number of these settlements likely 
benefit investors. 122  In sum, it can be said that states and investors win in 
roughly equal amounts. This helps render the regime more palatable.  
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An emphasis on the economic effects of a measure alleged to be 
equivalent to expropriation, as opposed to an inquiry focussed upon the 
aims or intentions of government, was quickly perceived by many actors as 
a threat to the right to regulate. Investment tribunals responded in two 
different ways. First, they purported to balance the effects of a regulation 
on investors against the importance of the public measure. In LG&E v. 
Argentina, for instance, the arbitrators admitted that ‘there must be a 
balance in the analysis both of the causes and the effects of a measure in 
order that one may qualify a measure as being of an expropriatory 
nature.’ 123  Alternatively, tribunals noted that regulations rarely had an 
effect equivalent to expropriation, reducing the frequency of regulatory 
expropriation to a few marginal cases. The SD Myers v. Canada tribunal, for 
instance, emphasized that ‘[e]xpropriations tend to involve the deprivation 
of ownership rights; regulations a lesser interference.’124 By reducing the 
ambit for regulatory expropriations, investment lawyers turned to FET as a 
means of filling in the void. If the factors deemed determinative in 
characterizing an expropriation included, among other things, investor 
expectations, the focus could now be directed exclusively upon the single 
factor of legitimate expectations. Arbitrators dutifully followed suit. 
In awards such as Occidental v. Ecuador I, arbitrators interpreted FET 
as requiring that states offer stable and predictable business 
environments. 125  This, in practice, generated the equivalent of what is 
known in the law of state contracts as a ‘stabilisation’ clause, rendering 
legal regimes irreversible without grandfathering affected investors or 
paying them compensation. With a focus on stability and predictability, 
arbitrators could rely upon what they characterized as the ‘universal’ 
doctrine of legitimate expectations. 126  Foreign investors are to be 
compensated when regulatory changes frustrate representations made by 
the host state – representations made by whatever means, including 
contract, license, legislation or regulation – and relied upon by the foreign 
investor at the moment the investment is established.  
While there have been attempts at narrowing the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations in subsequent awards, it continues to serve the 
interests of foreign investors who seek to challenge changes to existing 
regulatory frameworks. The doctrine of legitimate expectations, for 
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instance, was crucial to investor success in a series of disputes against 
Argentina precipitated by its 2001 economic crisis. Having taken measures 
to lessen the effects of the economic and social crisis, no investment 
tribunal found Argentina liable for indirect expropriation. Most tribunals, 
instead, concluded that Argentina was liable for breaching FET by upsetting 
investors’ legitimate expectations. These awards clearly bring to the 
surface the distributive implications of this legal order. Investment law not 
only favoured foreign over domestic investors but also over the rest of the 
Argentine population that could not claim to have an expectation to their 
jobs or salaries.127 Ironically, these were the same Argentines who were 
pressured to open their economy, privatize public enterprises and sign 
bilateral investment treaties a decade earlier.  
As in the case of the WTO, these awards were criticized for second 
guessing the substantive aims of state policy. An emphasis on process 
provided a way of eliding these critiques. Investment tribunals, not 
surprisingly, began to show an interest in procedural questions as a means 
of dampening critique. Arbitrators interpreted the procedural dimension of 
FET as requiring states to operate in a non-discriminatory, transparent, and 
non-arbitrary manner while penalizing states that did not provide to foreign 
investors the ability to participate in administrative processes that affected 
their interests. This focus on procedure has become useful as investment 
tribunals increasingly address disputes concerning the application and 
issuance of licences to exploit natural resources.  
The case of Clayton v. Canada is emblematic of this turn toward 
process. It also underscores how intimately connected is process to 
substance. Canada was ordered to pay compensation for violation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), having acted arbitrarily in 
refusing to permit the construction of a rock quarry and ferry terminal on 
sensitive shoreline in the province of Nova Scotia. While the U.S. investor 
was encouraged to proceed with the investment, it was understood that the 
investment would have to go through environmental screening as required 
by local law. An independent review panel undertook this assessment, 
convening thirteen days of hearings, and recommended the application be 
denied as the investment would cause harm to the marine, natural and 
human environments. The investment tribunal treated the review panel 
decision as procedurally flawed because it emphasized something the 
panel called ‘community core values.’ This was a focus denied to the panel 
by reason of its statutory authority, the tribunal concluded. This was by no 
means an obvious conclusion. It was, instead, a contentious interpretation 
of the panel’s enacting authority. As dissenting arbitrator McRae pointed 
out, community core values described a set of statutorily mandated 
considerations. The majority of the tribunal, nevertheless, accepted the 
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investor’s claim that its discussion of community core values was an 
‘essential basis of the Panel’s decision’ and that the panel, therefore, acted 
in an arbitrary fashion. 128  This produced, according to the dissenting 
arbitrator, a ‘disturbing result’ leading to a ‘remarkable step backwards in 
environmental protection.’ 
As in the case of WTO law and with the encouragement of scholars, 
some investment tribunals have turned to proportionality review as a 
means of securing legitimacy.	129 Neglecting this popular mode of inquiry, it 
is said, risks jeopardizing the future of investment arbitration.130 Despite 
this urging to embrace proportionality, few tribunals have been receptive 
nor, when they have been, have they performed this function very well. 
Instead, they have exhibited confusion by, for instance, assimilating 
proportionality into a determination of whether a treaty breach has 
occurred rather in relying upon it in the context of determining whether a 
deprivation of rights can be justified. Tribunals also have collapsed the 
requisite steps associated with the inquiry (suitability, necessity, and 
proportionate effect).131 In sum, proportionality as a response to legitimacy 
concerns has not worked out as hoped. 
Yet another strategy for responding to nagging legitimacy concerns 
is the proposal for an investment court.132 This is a project advanced by the 
European Commission in response to worries about arming US investors 
with the ability to launch disputes under the now stalled US-European trade 
and investment agreement (TTIP). After halting negotiations with the US 
and undertaking a European-wide consultation, the Commission returned 
with a proposal for an investment court having a tribunal of first instance 
together with an appellate body. Rather than exhibiting the features of a 
court, with security of tenure and independence, the European proposal 
appears to mimic, in its outlines, the dispute settlement bodies in the WTO. 
This is a strategy, in other words, that appropriates the features of what is 
perceived to be a successful global legal order, having overcome some of 
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its own legitimacy concerns. This could lend legitimacy to an allied regime 
that has yet to generate the same confidence. While only a couple of states, 
such as Canada and Vietnam, have shown a willingness to join in this 
project, we expect the EU will have some success in conscripting partners, 
given its economic influence, as it seeks to secure new trade and 
investment agreements.133 
Rather than relying on reforms having to do with process, some 
states have sought to reform treaty obligations by expressly incorporating a 
‘right to regulate.’134 Such clauses have been proliferating in newly minted 
investment treaties with the hope, again, of imitating the experience under 
GATT Article XX. While such textual signals might make a difference to 
some investment arbitration outcomes, they are as likely not to make much 
difference. This is because investment tribunals have a lot of interpretive 
scope and can choose to do with such clauses what they will. In any event, 
each of the standards of protection in investment law purport to 
incorporate exceptions, such as a public interest justification under 
national treatment or a police powers exception under expropriation and 
nationalization. Standards already are interpreted so as to incorporate 
consideration of what might be called a right to regulate, and yet 
legitimacy concerns persist.  
There is also little reason to be confident that an express adoption of 
a right to regulate will make much of a difference given another feature of 
investment arbitration. The regime is structured in such a way that 
arbitrators have an incentive both to accept jurisdiction (tribunals have this 
exclusive competence) and to interpret standards of protection widely. If 
we treat arbitrators as rational economic actors – they assume, after all, 
that everyone else is motivated by economic self-interest – we can assume 
that they would want to encourage new claimants to come forward. As the 
system is triggered only at the behest of investors, there is impetus for 
arbitrators to issue reasons that facilitates future arbitration business. As 
we have mentioned, this cannot mean that investors will win all of the time. 
Rather, arbitrators will endeavor to strike a balance between investors and 
states that will not drive either party away. Yet the system does not appear 
to serve even investors very well. There are persistent complaints that it is 
costly and slow and not easily available to small and medium sized 
enterprises. It turns out that investment dispute settlement best serves the 
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interests of arbitrators, lawyers, and some large multinational 
corporations.135 
 
 
To conclude, IEL shows a growing convergence towards a single 
imaginary of the right to regulate. Even then, general, non-discriminatory, 
reasonable measures to curb negative externalities and market failures are 
not so easily defended at the WTO or before investment tribunals. Whatever 
successes states and citizens can secure before these dispute resolution 
bodies are not sufficient to redistribute the costs and benefits of the global 
economy. IEL contributes to dampening the role of states and the potential 
for democracies to come to the defence of their populations. The people 
are, accordingly, limited in their ability to respond to the social costs of 
markets. The right to regulate grants to states only a passive role. 
Interference with trade or investment transactions is discouraged if not 
forbidden. Problems begin with any attempt either to reduce pain and 
precarity or to change the rules that unevenly distribute that pain and 
precarity.   
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that states are expected to behave in ways that do 
not encumber trade and investment flows. Should they do so, they will run 
afoul of global legal rules. Existing distributions of wealth thereby remain 
secure while the insecurities experienced by many remain unaddressed. 
The precarious condition of populations, in both the developed and 
developing world, is more difficult to address or is worsened. Yet states 
remain the most salient political actor in the world today and it is to them 
that the most vulnerable will look for protection.   
By emphasizing the distributional effects of IEL, we hope to 
challenge both the triumphalist tone of the trade lawyers and the tepid 
response of investment lawyers to these challenges. According to Piketty, 
inherited wealth is coming to predominate over earned income in the 21st 
century, just as it did in the age of the Belle Époque. As this is a problem 
that traditionally is addressed by national measures,136 Piketty proposes a 
global wealth tax to supplement local income taxation. ‘A progressive levy 
on individual wealth,’ he writes, ‘would reassert control over capitalism in 
the name of the general interest.’137  
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Piketty does not seek out a remedy by addressing the governing legal 
rules of trade and investment. He does acknowledge, however, that a rise in 
foreign investment does not enhance equality but is, instead, likely to 
hinder it.138 It is no coincidence, in our view, that the period identified by 
Piketty in which wage inequality really takes off – the 1980s – is the very 
same period in which neoliberal values took hold in international financial 
institutions and those of IEL.  
As states remove trade barriers and reregulate so as to smooth 
capital flows, they contribute to deepening inequality within their own 
countries. Indisputably, new technologies and increasing integration 
provide a different terrain for the global struggle over who wins and who 
loses. But this terrain is neither static nor preordained. For the critical 
lawyer, piercing the veil of the complex and expert discussions within IEL is 
not enough. It is also necessary to both consider recovering old and 
developing new legal imaginaries. In this regard, placing inequality at the 
centre of IEL, for us, is just the first step. 
 
 
                                                             
138 PIKETTY id. at 68, 70 (speaking of Africa). 
